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EXHIBITION OF A CHILD IN COURT TO DETERMINE PATERNITY
Glascock v. Anderson, 83 N.M. 725,497
P.2d 727 (1972)
Plaintiff successfully brought a paternity suit against defendant.
The defendant appealed, citing as error the exhibition of the plaintiff's
year old child to the jury. The Supreme Court of New Mexico af-
firmed and held: a child may be exhibited to the trier of fact to have
the child's features observed and compared with those of the putative
father.'
Though reliable and relevant evidence is generally admissible, the
trial judge may exclude it if its prejudice outweighs its probative value.2
Evidence which is submitted to the trier of fact, who then "inspects"
the evidence through the use of his senses so as to perceive facts about
it, is demonstrative evidence." An example of demonstrative evidence
is the exhibition of a child before the trier of fact in a paternity suit to
show his resemblance to the father. Courts have split over the pro-
priety of exhibiting a child to the jury as an aid in determining pater-
nity:' a few courts absolutely prohibit exhibition; 5 others allow the
I. Glascock v. Anderson, 83 N.M. 725, 497 P.2d 727 (1972).
2. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 151-52 (1954); cf. UNIFORM RULE
513 1963); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, at § 179.
3. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Viking Supply Corp., 411 P.2d 814 (Ariz. App. 1966);
Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964); Rich v. Cooper, 234 Ore. 300, 380 P.2d
513 (1963); C. McCoRuIcK, supra note 2, at § 179.
4. Evidence of resemblance, both through the exhibition of the child and testi-
mony, was admissible and competent until the eighteenth century in England. The
tendency now in that country is to discount its value. See S. ScHrATKIN, DIsPuTED
PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 126 (2d ed. 1947). For a collection of English cases, see 1 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 166 n.2 [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. The leading English case is
the Douglas Cause, 2 Hargrave Collectania Jurdicia 386, 402 (1769), in which Lord
Mansfield noted:
I have always considered likeness as an argument of a child's being the son
of a parent; and the rather, as the distinction between individuals in the human
species is more discernible than in other animals; a man may survey ten
thousand people before he sees two faces perfectly alike; and in an army of an
hundred thousand men, every one may be known from another. If there
should be a likeness of features there may be a discriminancy of voice, a
difference in the gesture, the smile, and various other things; whereas a fam-
ily-likeness runs generally through all these, for in everything there is a re-
semblance, as of features, features [sic], size, attitude and action . ...
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child to be exhibited if he is sufficiently mature to possess "settled fea-
tures"6 or if only certain aspects of the alleged resemblance are to be
compared;7 and some courts allow exhibition without qualification. 8
Most courts that refuse to allow the exhibition of children to deter-
mine paternity consider evidence of resemblance between a child and
the putative father unreliable9 because jurors cannot evaluate its sig-
For the view of early medical authorities, see 1 T. BECK, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
499-500 (6th ed. 1838); A. DEAN, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 90 (1854); A. HERZO0,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 734-59 (1931).
When the question of race is involved, authorities generally agree that evidence of
resemblance is admissible. According to Wigmore:
[The] progeny of persons of one race receive from the progenitors certain
corporal traits very different from the traits transmitted from a progenitor
of another race. The presence of the peculiar traits of the race is therefore
evidential to show a progenitor of the race bearing those traits. The admis-
sibility of this evidence has never been doubted by courts ....
1 WiGMORE, supra at § 167. See S. SCAT=N, supra at 126; Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97,
131 (1924). But see Almeida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, -, 465 P.2d 564, 570 n,9
(1970), suggesting that the question of race should be the subject of expert testimony.
5. See, e.g., Bilkovie v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719, 141 N.Y.S. 279 (1912);
Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N.Y.S. 279 (Sur. Ct. 1934); Cook v. State,
172 Tenn. 42, 109 S.W.2d 98 (1937); State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901);
Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885). Cf. note 9 infra.
6. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dictum);
Fillipone v. United States, 2 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Hassler v. District of Colum-
bia, 122 A.2d 827 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956); Hall v. Centolanza, 28 N.J. Super. 391,
101 A.2d 44 (1953); Yerian v. Brinker, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 591, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio
App. 1941). See also notes 14-16 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., People v. Kingcannon, 276 Ill. 251, 114 N.E. 508 (1916); Lawhead
v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 P. 376 (1924); State v. Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224
P. 442 (1924). Cf. note 13 infra.
8. See Kelly v. State, 133 Ala. 195, 32 So. 56 (1902); Yielding v. State, 23
Ala. App. 335, 125 So. 203 (1929); Narrell v. State, 22 Ala. App. 548, 117 So. 609
(19,28); Green v. State, 22 Ala. App. 297, 115 So. 71 (1928); Brantley v. State, 11
Ala. App. 144, 65 So. 678 (1914); Green v. Commonwealth ex rel. Helms, 297 Ky. 675,
180 S.W.2d 865 (1944); Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 26 N.E. 871 (1891);
Finnegan v. Dugan, 96 Mass. 197 (1867); People v. Haab, 260 Mich. 673, 245 N.W.
545 (1932); Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N.H. 108 (1859); Gaunt v. State, 50 N.J.L. 490,
14 A. 600 (Ct. Err. & App. 1867); Glascock v. Anderson, 83 N.M. 725, 487 P.2d 72
(1972); State v. Woodruff, 67 N.C. 89 (1872); Pope v. Kincaid, 99 W. Va. 677, 129
S.E. 752 (1925). Cf. Smith v. Hawkins, 93 Miss. 588, 47 So. 429 (1905); Anderson v.
Aupperle, 51 Ore. 556, 95 P. 330 (1908).
9. See Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 51 Hawaii 649, 466 P.2d 452 (1970); Almeida v.
Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970); Robnett v. People, 16 Ill. App. 299
(1885); Risk v. State, 19 Ind. 152 (1862) (dictum); Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454,
15 A. 56 (1888); Bilkovie v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719, 141 N.Y.S. 279 (1912);
Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N.Y.S. 279 (Sur. Ct. 1934); In re Wen-
del's Estate, 146 Misc. 269, 262 N.Y.S. 41 (Sur. Ct. 1933) (dictum); Cook v. State,
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nificance' 0 and prejudicial because jurors might imagine resem-
blances." The difficulty with preserving a satisfactory record of the
exhibition of a child for review also militates against the use of such
evidence.1
Some jurisdictions that allow children to be exhibited have devel-
oped rules to help preserve a record of the evidence presented, to in-
sure the reliability of the evidence and to minimize its prejudicial ef-
fect. The court may require that counsel lay a foundation, through
testimony or comment, indicating which features of the child and the
putative father are similar; or the court may simply encourage counsel
to comment on similarities. 1*3 To minimize unreliability and prejudice,
172 Tenn. 42, 109 S.W.2d 98 (1937); State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901);
State er rcl. Schehlein v. Duris, 54 Wis. 2d 34, 194 N.W.2d 613 (1972) (dictum);
Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885). Cf. Keniston v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38
(1839). Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876). Whether these prohibitions are absolute is
not always clear; a court could allow a child who is older or who has some peculiarity
to be exhibited. The New York rule and the Wisconsin rule completely prohibit any
exhibitions. But see Parrent, Exhibiting the Child to the Jury in Paternity Cases:
Hawaii's New Rule, 10 J. FAM. L. 30 n.2 (1970), suggesting that the New York rule
may not completely prohibit exhibition because the New York Court of Appeals has not
ruled on this question and the New York cases are distinguishable because they are
rape cases, This, however, may be at artificial distinction, since Bilkovie and
Bcuschel, supra, were civil actions for damages due to assault and rape, and many
jurisdictions that allow the child to be exhibited have refused to distinguish rape
cases from bastardy proceedings. See Kovacsics v. State, 193 Ind. 228, 139 N.E. 359
(1923); State v. Kipers, 109 Kan. 577, 201 P. 68 (1921); State v. Danforth, 73
N.H. 215, 60 A. 839 (1905); Zell v. State, 14 Ohio App. 446 (1922). Cf. Green v.
State, 176 Tenn. 449, 143 S.W.2d 713 (1940); Bishop v. Webster, 154 Va. 771, 153
SE. 832 (1930).
10. See Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 51 Hawaii 649, 466 P.2d 452 (1970); Almeida v.
Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970).
11. See Bilkovie v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719, 141 N.Y.S. 279 (1913); Hanawalt
v. State. 64 Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885). Cf. State v. Thomas, 38 Wyo. 72, 264 P.
1017 (1928). Bilk-ovie suggests that if all other factors are equal, the jury might
accept the plaintiffs testimony if they imagine a resemblance. See also Gallina v.
Antonelli, 220 Cal. App. 2d 63, 33 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1963), in which the judge refused
to view the child because he could not perceive resemblances between parents and
children.
12. See State v. Harvey, 112 Iowa 416, 84 N.W. 535 (1900); Glascock v. Ander-
son, 83 N.M. 725, 497 P.2d 727 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Hanawalt v. State, 64
Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885).
13. See Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 73 So. 234 (1916); Yerian v. Brinker, 330
Ohio L. Abs. 591, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio App. 1941); Hall v. Centolanza, 28 N.J. Super.
381, 101 A.2d 44 (1953); State v. Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442 (1924). Cf.
Hassler v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 827 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956). Hall and
Yerian state that oral comment is desirable because it is open to cross examination and
objection, and may provide some guidelines for the jury and reviewing court.
247
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some courts either refuse to allow the exhibition of any child who is be-
low a certain age or, since children do not develop uniformly, the
judge decides whether the child is sufficiently mature to have settled
features. 4 Although courts have been reluctant to establish specific
age requirements, decisions of a few jurisdictions indicate that infants
less than one year of age may not be exhibited." In some jurisdictions
failure of the judge to determine that a child meets the settled features
requirement is error.', Other jurisdictions, purporting to follow the
settled features rule, fail to enforce it, and the judge has unbridled
discretion to determine whether a child will be exhibited.' 7  If exhibi-
tion is allowed, the jury has the responsibility of assessing the weight
14. Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Fillipone v. United
States, 2 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Hassler v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 827
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956); Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 73 So. 234 (1916); Hall v.
Centolanza, 28 N.J. Super. 381, 101 A.2d 44 (1953); Yerian v. Brinker, 330 Ohio L.
Abs. 591, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio App. 1941); Roberts v. State, 205 Okla. 632, 240 P.2d
104 (1951); Ratzlaff v. State, 102 Okla. 263, 229 P. 278 (1924); Lawhead v. State,
99 Okla. 197, 226 P. 376 (1924); State ex rel. Fitch v. Powers, 75 S.D. 209, 62
N.W.2d 764 (1954); State v. Forbes, 108 Vt. 361, 187 A. 422 (1936); Lohsen v.
Lawson, 106 Vt. 481, 174 A. 861 (1934).
The reason for the settled features rule was explained in I WGMORE § 166:
(1) The fanciful acceptance of a resemblance-which is the danger feared-
is only likely where the child is so young as to have decidedly unmarked
features; and it is both proper and feasible to obviate this objection by ex-
cluding the evidence where the child is too young, either by leaving the mat-
ter to the trial court's discretion, or by fixing a minimum age. (2) The
physiological principle being perfectly well settled, it is poor policy to ex-
clude invariably a piece of evidence that will usually be useful merely because
it may occasionally be abused.
15. Compare State v. Smith, 54 Iowa 104, 6 N.W. 153 (1881), with State v. Har-
vey, 112 Iowa 416, 84 N.W. 535 (1900), and State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa 43 (1878).
See also Overlock v. Hall, 81 Me. 348, 17 A. 169 (1889); Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me.
454, 15 A. 56 (1888). Compare Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 320, 39 S.W. 684
(1897), with Gray v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 300, 65 S.W. 375 (1901).
16. Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dictum); Filli-
pone v. United States, 2 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Hassler v. District of Columbia,
122 A.2d 827 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956); Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 73 So. 234
(1916); Hall v. Centolanza, 28 N.J. Super. 381, 101 A.2d 44 (1953); Yerian v. Brinker,
330 Ohio L. Abs. 591, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio App. 1941). In Fillipone, the jury was
instructed that the exhibition had no evidentiary value unless it showed the reproduc-
tion of physical characteristics peculiar to the alleged father and so striking as to leave
no doubt.
17. See State ex rel. Fitch v. Powers, 75 S.D. 209, 62 N.W.2d 764 (1954). Com-
pare State v. Forbes, 108 Vt. 361, 187 A. 422 (1936), with Lohsen v. Lawson, 106
Vt. 481, 174 A. 861 (1934). Compare Roberts v. State, 205 Okla. 632, 240 P.2d 104
(1951), with Lawhead v. State, 99 Okla. 197, 226 P. 376 (1924).
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and credibility of the evidence in light of the child's maturity. 8
In jurisdictions where exhibition is always allowed, it is thought that
the age, maturity and strength of resemblance of the child affect the
weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. 19 Proponents of
this position assert that judges are no more competent than jurors to
assess the maturity of the child and the significance of resemblance.
The court in Glascock v. Anderson20 adopted this position, which is
contrary to the typical rule requiring the judge to make all decisions
on the admissibility of evidence.
The Glascock court formulated a rule that admits all relevant evi-
dence of resemblance, whether by way of expert testimony, comparisons
by persons familiar with the father and child, or comparisons made by the
jury. 1  No foundation showing that the child has characteristics or
features indicative of paternity need be laid, since it is the function of
the jury to decide whether a resemblance exists.22
18. State v. Mesquita, 17 Ariz. App. 151, 496 P.2d 141 (1972); State v. Cabrera,
13 Ariz. App. 527, 478 P.2d 142 (1970).
19. Sce Judway v. Kovacs, 4 Conn. Cir. 713, 239 A.2d 556 (1967) (dictum);
Green v. Commonwealth ex rel. Helms, 297 Ky. 675, 180 S.W.2d 865 (1944); People
v. Haab, 260 Mich. 673, 245 N.W. 545 (1932); Zell v. State, 15 Ohio App. 446 (1922);
Bishop v. Webster, 154 Va. 771, 153 S.E. 832 (1930).
20. 83 N.M. 725, 497 P.2d 727 (1972).
21. Id. at 727, 497 P.2d at 729:
Any relevant evidence, whether by way of expert opinion, by way of com-
parisons of features and traits made by the jury from observations of the
features and traits of the child and the features and traits of the purported
father, or by way of testimony of persons in a position of advantage to ob-
serve and draw comparisons between the features and traits of the child and
those of the alleged father, should be admitted ....
The court in Glascock did not confront the question of admitting testimony of a
layman without an exhibition. The opinion suggests that it might be permissible.
This seems inconsistent with part of the justification for the rule that was adopted. If
Wigmore's formulation was rejected because the judge's discretion was interposed be-
tween the jury and the child, interposing a witness between the child and the jury, and
not allowing the jury to observe the child, would be even less desirable. The opinion in
Glascock, however, emphasizes that the jurors are to weigh the evidence.
22. Despite the absence of a foundation indicating what comparisons the jury
is to make, the court expects the jurors to confine their comparisons to "specific traits"
and "individual features"; no "fancied general resemblance" is to be considered. Jus-
tice Stephenson, in his dissenting opinion to the Glascock decision, states, id. at
729, 497 P.2d at 731:
Aside from the question of how the jury's mind is to be riveted to individual
features and specific traits to the exclusion of fancied general resemblance
when the infant is displayed, and assuming a definite resemblance of an indi-
vidual feature or a specific trait, what, I inquire, has been proven.
Even if we then further assume that the trier of the facts is fully informed
as to the workings of Mendel's law of genetics and the functioning and
249
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In adopting this rule, the Glascock court failed to adequately con-
sider the objections of other courts to the use of evidence of resem-
blance. First, because many genetic variables interact to determine
appearance, comparing a child with the putative father to determine if
a resemblance exists does not provide a reliable indicium of paternity. 23
Secondly, because the exhibition of a child is likely to evoke sym-
pathy, the prejudicial effect of an exhibition is likely to outweigh
whatever probative value such evidence has. 4
interplay of the genes of the parents in relation to such feature or trait
(knowledge which would apparently place the jury head and shoulders above
authorities in the field) we are still left, under the hypothetical assumptions
stated, with a mere possibility that the putative father is the father. I do not
regard such a possibility as being evidence.
23. See Almeida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594,--, 465 P.2d 564, 569 (1970):
Just as a child's face is not inherited as a unit, neither is an individual
feature inherited as a unit from any one parent.. .. Rather, inheritance
has been traced to physical traits even more specific than a single feature.
Consider, for example, the effect of heredity on the nose. Some studies might
indicate that there is one key gene producing the general shape of the nose,
but most authorities agree that quite a number of genes are at work, each on a
different part. That is, there may be separate genes for the bridge (its shape,
height, and length); the nostrils (breadth, shape and size of apertures); the
root of the nose and its juncture with the upper lip; and the bulb, or point of
the nose.
At any rate, it is clear that distinctive genes are at work, and that they
work out independently; otherwise, the nose of every child would be a blend
of its parents' noses. Even in the most inbred peoples, however, noses of
every shape and size appear, providing the Mendelian segregation and sort-
ing out of the "nose" genes. . . . In short, the individual does not "inherit"
characteristics but only the potentialities to develop in a certain way through
the transmitted genes. Moreover, since genes themselves interact, all genes
probably affect all characteristics to a certain degree.
24. In Almeida v. Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970), the court felt that
exhibitions might be useful to illustrate expert testimony, but because of the prejudicial
effect, the court prohibited exhibitions.
The resemblance test only seems to excite the sympathies of the jury. Many judges
and jurors admit after the trial that they were impressed by the resemblance of the
child to the defendant and gave that evidence much weight. Krause, Scientific Evidence
and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252, 272 (1971). See Hatcher v.
State ex rel. McGill, 24 Tenn. App. 213, 142 S.W.2d 326 (1940) (trial judge's lengthy
comment upon the resemblance of the child to defendant cited as error). The court
in Glascock, however, indicated that it believes jurors will not be unduly influenced.
83 N.M. at 727, 497 P.2d at 729.
Some courts have held the presence of the child in the courtroom, even though the
child was not introduced into evidence, to be prejudicial and error. Harrison v.
District of Columbia, 95 A.2d 332 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); Williams v. State ex rel.
Taylor, 80 Fla. 286, 85 So. 917 (1920). Other courts have allowed the child to be
present in the courtroom, or introduced as evidence to corroborate the plaintiff's
testimony or to show damages. Morris v. Stanford, 58 Ga. App. 726, 199 S.E. 773
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Since expert evaluation of anthropological data can aid in deter-
mining paternity, evidence of resemblance no longer need be an im-
portant factor in determining paternity. 21 If expert opinion were uti-
lized to determine the parentage of a child, no sympathy-engendering
exhibition of the child would need be made, and the possibility of in-
accurate determinations would be miniried. Since the facts under-
lying the expert's opinion would be recorded, 26 it would be more feasi-
ble to review on appeal than the determination of resemblance.
(1938): Nott v. Bender, 246 Ind. 186, 202 N.E.2d 745 (1964); Merritt v. Leuck, 231
Iowa 777, 2 N.W.2d 49 (1942); State v. Stark, 149 Iowa 749, 129 N.W. 331 (1911);
State v. Hunt, 144 Iowa 228, 122 N.W. 903 (1909); State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541,
65 P. 494 (1901).
25. Keiter, Advances in Anthropological Paternity Testing, 21 AM. J. Piys.
ANTHRO. 81 (1963):
The data at the disposal of the physical anthropologist contain sufficient in-
formation to determine 19 out of 20 cases at a level of three sigma signifi-
cance (99.73 + probability) whether a given individual is the parent of a
child in question. Only about 5% of all diagnoses remain uncertain.
The anthropological approach compares inheritable traits such as blood group sys-
tems, dermatoglyphic traits, and measurements. Krause, supra note 24, at 271.
The importance of blood tests in establishing that a man is not the father of a child
should not be overlooked. Since children carry only the blood of their parents, factors
cannot be present in a child's blood that are not present in the blood of either parent.
The A-B-O, M-N-Ss and Rh-Hr systems are used in bloodtyping. The more factors
used, the greater the number of men that can be excluded as the possible father. Exclu-
sions can be established with certainty, inclusions can be established by degrees of
probability. Id. at 261. For more information on bloodtyping, see 5 R. GRAY, AT-
TORNEYS' TEXTBooK OF MEDICINE T 304.12 (3d ed. 1971); K. SIMPSON, MODERN
TRENDS IN FORENSIC MEDICINE 110 (1953).
26. Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159 (1902); Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Morris,
67 Kan. 410, 73 P. 108 (1903).
27. The Glascock dissent addresses the problem of preserving the evidence for
review when an exhibition is used. An appellate court cannot adequately deal with a
case that allows the child to be presented if 1) there is no substantial evidence of pa-
ternity except the exhibition; 2) neither party's evidence preponderates; or 3) a party
objects to an exhibition on the grounds that no resemblance exists and his objection
is overruled. 83 N.M. at 729, 497 P.2d at 731.
See LD v. JD, 481 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1972), in which the reviewing court, not
afforded the opportunity to see the child, deferred to the findings of the trial court,
which had seen the child.
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